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the state), universalism and particularism (the relation of man to man), and pluralism versus dominance (the nature of 
knowledge and truth). Continuities are found between the Communist Soviet Union and post-Communist Russia in their 
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1. Introduction 
International comparative research on media and jour-
nalism shifted attention, though not strictly consecu-
tively in time, from normative press theories (e.g. 
Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956) over media struc-
tures (e.g. Hallin & Mancini, 2004) to journalism culture 
(e.g. Hanitzsch, 2011). Although the approach is differ-
ent, they all touch the same ground: the interconnect-
edness between media and broader society. Media sys-
tems are not isolated systems: they differ according to 
the societies they are embedded in. This is in essence 
the most prominent thesis of the classical work Four 
Theories of the Press (Siebert et al., 1956, pp. 1-2): 
“The press always takes on the form and coloration of 
the social and political structures within which it oper-
ates. Especially, it reflects the system of social control 
whereby the relations of individuals and institutions 
are adjusted.” Hallin and Mancini (2004, p. 8), in their 
turn, follow this thesis: “We shall follow the agenda set 
out by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm in attempting 
to show how different media models are rooted in 
broader differences of political and economic struc-
ture.” The variety in journalisms among countries also 
inspired the Worlds of Journalism project of Hanitzsch 
and colleagues. Professional milieus in journalism, de-
fined by underlying value orientations, cut across na-
tional boundaries but are unevenly distributed among 
countries: “the nation still seems to be a primary refer-
ence for journalists and their practices” (Hanitzsch, 
2011, p. 492).  
In particular the interdependence between the me-
dia system and the political system seems beyond 
doubt. Political authorities naturally tend to use media 
as propaganda outlets and political instruments, but 
they are also able to install restrictions so as to restrain 
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themselves and others from doing so. Politicians make 
media laws and shape media policy. Political models 
are the starting point for the majority of normative 
media theories and typologies. In reference to Four 
Theories of the Press, Hallin and Mancini (2004, p. 1) 
place their “primary focus on the relation between 
media systems and political systems”. The Interde-
pendence between the media system and the political 
system of one society is also empirically researched. 
Engesser and Franzetti (2011), for example, have done 
this on dimensions of freedom, diversity, centrality and 
tradition. The findings of Hanitzsch (2011, p. 492) in the 
context of journalism cultures “especially point to the 
significance of political forces that impose important 
limits on the professional autonomy of journalists.”  
The Communist system of the former Soviet Union 
is especially illustrative of the strong link between me-
dia and politics. Politics ceased to exist in the Soviet 
Union as a separate subsystem as everything became 
politicized. Media institutions were political institutions 
in the first place, and journalists were considered party 
workers. The ideology of Marxism-Leninism operated 
as the societal glue. Hence, the Soviet Union presented 
a clear, coherent, and distinct media model in line with 
its general political, economic, and ideological model. It 
was labelled the Communist model, the Soviet model, 
or the Marxist model. It was characterized by state 
(and party) ownership, centralization, partisan journal-
ism, and (ideological) censorship (de Smaele, 2010).  
As easy as labelling the Communist Soviet Union, as 
puzzling seems labelling post-Communist Russia. Con-
sequently, both the media and the political (and socie-
tal) system are often described in terms of paradoxes 
(see for example Pasti & Nordenstreng, 2013; de 
Smaele, 2006) and contrasts between theory and prac-
tice, between law and its implementation, between 
hearts and minds. An overview of classifications (de 
Smaele, 2010) shows labels that suggest a congruence 
with the democratic, Western model that is at best su-
perficial and imperfect (democracy and market econ-
omy accompanied by epithets such as pseudo, illiberal, 
delegated or even authoritarian or totalitarian) and 
more indigenous Russian labels without even a refer-
ence to Western models such as elite corporatism 
(Shevtsova, 1996), etatism (Vartanova, 2006) or the au-
thoritarian-corporate model (Zassoursky, 1999). One 
concept that has been particularly useful for the last 
twenty years and with a wider scope than Russia alone, 
is that of post-Communism.  
The notion of post-Communism indicates the all-
pervasive influence and heritage of Communism. It is 
used to label the time period immediately following 
the Communist period. If something like a totalitarian 
syndrome exists—“a specific pattern of cognitions, atti-
tudes and behaviours, developed in order to adapt to 
life under totalitarian circumstances” (Klicperová, Fei-
erabend, & Hofstetter, 1997, p. 39), it is only plausible 
that also a post-totalitarian syndrome plays its part. 
Several authors have pointed at the importance of 
mindsets and habits, routines, norms and values in de-
termining the (often disappointing) pace of reforms: “It 
is not enough to introduce new institutions: what is al-
so needed is the cultural foundations of those institu-
tions, the values, attitudes and beliefs which make 
them work, and which encourage the people to take 
them for granted.” (Jakubowicz, 2005, p.2)  
Cultural foundations, values, attitudes and beliefs 
are at the centre of this study. The aim of this article is 
to look into the basic values underlying the attitude 
towards information in Russia during the transition 
from Communism to post-Communism, or from the 
Soviet Union (1917−1991) into the Russian Federation 
(1991−1999). A study on values evidently implies a 
longer time dimension as values do evolve albeit only 
slowly. The focus is on continuities between two histor-
ical periods that appear as separate in history books 
and timelines defined by the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. At the same time, abrupt discontinuity 
is already tempered by the use of terms such as post-
Communism, transition or transformation. Especially 
the Gorbachev years of glasnost and perestroika 
(1985−1991) are considered a crucial bridge period be-
tween Communism and post-Communism. Whereas 
both the era of Gorbachev (1985−1991) and Yeltsin 
(1991−1999) are included in this study, the Putin peri-
od (1999−today) is beyond its scope.  
The article is structured as follows. First, we explain 
the concept of information culture in general terms. 
Three value pairs are singled out as underlying the in-
formation culture in a given society: individualism-
collectivism, universalism-particularism, pluralism-
dominance. Secondly, we name the values prevalent in 
the former Soviet Union and compare them with the 
values dominant in Russia throughout the 1990s. The 
connection between values and society is not based 
upon one single survey but on a multitude of surveys, 
authors, testimonials and observations adding to the 
strength of the argument. By its method, the article 
can be considered a meta-analysis of divergent studies 
on Russian mass media scrutinized from the new angle 
of how information is produced and perceived within 
the society.  
2. The Concept of Information Culture 
In political science, the concept of political culture has 
taken hold strongly and is widely elaborated on. It has 
taught us that a certain political system (structure) is—
or must be—supported by a certain political culture as 
a set of attitudes, beliefs, values. Pioneering research 
on this topic was done by Gabriel Almond and Sidney 
Verba, in The Civic Culture (1963/1989). The idea, how-
ever, is not new. Plato already taught us that forms of 
government (oligarchy, democracy, aristocracy, tyran-
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ny) differ according to dispositions of men. In the Sovi-
et Union, the concept of political culture was intro-
duced by Burlatsky in the 1970s. White (1979, p. 58) 
traces the term policheskaya kul’tura back to Lenin and 
more recently to Brezhnev. But it is obviously in post-
Communist Russia that the term is increasingly used 
(e.g. Sergeyev & Biryukov, 1993).  
The concept of political culture provides a link be-
tween the macro-structure (society) and the micro-
structure (individual): “Outcomes at the system level 
are thought to be determined by the interactions of in-
dividuals acting consistently in terms of the axioms of 
individual behaviour, whatever they may be. We make 
assumptions about individual consumers to understand 
markets, about voters to understand politics, and 
about bureaucrats to understand bureaucracies” 
(March & Olsen, 1984, p. 736). Sergeyev and Biryukov 
(1993) base their study of the Russian parliament on 
the same principle. A parliament is not only an institu-
tion, operating according to certain rules and proce-
dures, but also an organisation of “living minds”: “The 
knowledge, habits, patterns of behaviour, ideas and 
social preconceptions of those who work in it have a 
profound impact on how it functions” (p. 7). All defini-
tions of political culture encompass the following ele-
ments: attitudes (mainly attitudes towards authority), 
values, belief systems (ideological or pragmatic), a cog-
nitive component (citizens’ level of knowledge) and an 
affective component (identification with the political 
system, engagement or alienation). Political culture is 
part of the broader culture in an anthropological sense. 
Political values and orientations are intertwined with 
values and orientations in a broader sense (Brown, 
1979, p. 4, Deutsch, 1974, p. 237). Like other cultural 
concepts, the concept of political culture points to 
what is idiosyncratic in political and social systems. 
Analogous concepts such as “academic culture” or 
“business culture” are increasingly being used. The 
concept of “information culture” is used predominantly 
in combination with information technology and digital 
media in the sense of coping with new information 
technologies. But also in the concept of “business cul-
ture” or “organisational culture”, information plays a 
central role. It points at common orientations and 
practices within the organisation with regard to shar-
ing, using, distributing information. Like political cul-
ture, information culture cannot be separated from 
culture as a whole but while political culture deals with 
orientations and attitudes towards authority and the 
distribution of authority, information culture deals with 
attitudes towards information and the distribution of 
information. Culture and communication are thus ex-
plicitly linked to each other. This is also the case in the 
view of Hall and Hall (1987), who define culture as pri-
marily a system for creating, sending, storing and pro-
cessing information. Informational culture, then, could 
be reduced to culture tout court.  
Culture provides a link between present, past and 
future (its vertical dimension) and between different 
subsystems within society (its horizontal dimension). 
We consider the media system as an integral part of 
the broader societal system. The media system is a so-
cial system, encompassing media-institutions, media 
workers (such as journalists), the public, the politicians 
and news sources as well as the relations between all 
these actors, settled by laws, institutions and norms. 
McQuail (1994, p. 2) defines the media system as a 
“social institution, with its own distinctive set of norms 
and practices but with the scope of its activities subject 
to definition and limitation by the wider society”. On 
the one hand, the media system operates according to 
intrinsic values and strives for autonomy; on the other 
hand, and at the same time, it is not an isolated system 
but it operates in close connection with the respective 
political, economic, and juridical systems as it is 
grounded in basically the same “culture”. The concept 
of culture supposes a great deal of inertia and continui-
ty—otherwise the term would not be able to exist 
(Wyman, 2000, p. 106). Triandis (1995, p. 4) has put 
the vertical dimension aptly: “Culture is to society, 
what memory is to individuals.” 
To summarize, we consider culture as a set of val-
ues, norms and beliefs that shape behaviour, as shared 
by a relatively large section of society (horizontal) and 
transmitted from one generation to another (vertical). 
In our further discussion, we limit ourselves to values 
as the most stable constituents of culture. The notion 
of “philosophy” used by Siebert et al. (1956) suggests a 
number of values: “one has to look at certain basic be-
liefs and assumptions which the society holds: the na-
ture of man, the nature of society and the state, the re-
lation of man to the state, and the nature of 
knowledge and truth” (p. 2). As the nature of man and 
society are most easily answered in relation to each 
other, the first three “questions” are reduced to two: 
the relation of man to the state is described by the val-
ues of individualism and collectivism, and the relation 
of man to man by the values of universalism and par-
ticularism. The nature of knowledge and truth is dis-
cussed with the help of the values pluralism and domi-
nance. 
3. Values Underlying the Information Culture in Russia 
3.1. Relation of Man to the State: Collectivism versus 
Individualism 
The values of individualism and collectivism express 
the two basic positions with regard to the relation of 
man to the state. In an individualistic theory, the indi-
vidual is a rational being and an end in itself, whose 
happiness and well-being is the goal of society. In the 
collectivistic theory, the individual is, above all, a part 
of society, and not an end in itself. The group takes on 
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a greater importance, since only through the group 
may an individual accomplish his/her purposes (Siebert 
et al., 1956, p. 11). Individualism and collectivism are 
considered as values at the level of the community or 
society, not at the individual level. They cannot be 
equalized to egoism and altruism. Collectivism is not al-
truism but “in-group egoism” (Hofstede, 1994, p. xiii). 
Some authors use different terms to distinguish be-
tween the cultural and personal levels. Triandis (1995), 
for example, uses “idiocentrism” and “allocentrism” on 
the individual level in contrast to collectivism and indi-
vidualism on the societal level. Berry (1994) uses indi-
vidualism and collectivism for both levels but in combi-
nation with “societal” or “personal”. Kagitçibasi (1994) 
replaces individualism and collectivism by “cultures of 
relatedness” and “cultures of separateness” to avoid 
the negative connotation of collectivism with group 
pressure and mass behaviour. Individualism is com-
monly associated with liberalism: the focus is on the 
individual, on individual rights, initiative, and individual 
freedom. In an individualist society, the individual right 
to information (“right to know”) prevails and media are 
expected to act accordingly. In a collectivist society, the 
general interest prevails over the individual right to in-
formation and the media primarily act as instruments 
of the authorities.  
As for the Soviet Union, few dispute the collectivist 
nature of society expressed “by placing social (state, 
Party, group) loyalties above individual rights” (Kon, 
1996, p. 188). Art. 39 of the 1977 Constitution guaran-
teed the Soviet citizens social, economic, political, and 
personal rights and freedoms, but also stipulated that 
citizens’ rights might not be exercised at the expense 
of the interests of society or the state. Individual rights 
and freedoms (e.g. Art. 50: freedom of speech and the 
press) were awarded “in accordance with the interests 
of the people and in order to strengthen and develop 
the socialist system”. In Western liberalism, “state” 
(government, president, army, security services) 
(gosudarstvo) is considered as the antipode of “socie-
ty” (civil society) (obshchestvo). In the official Soviet 
discourse, however, state and society were as one, 
placed opposite the individual. Igor Kon (1996, p. 190) 
points out that neither the Soviet Philosophical Ency-
clopedia of the 1960s nor the six successive editions of 
the Ethical Dictionary, published between 1965 and 
1989, had an entry on “personal” or “private” life. Pri-
vate life was only briefly touched upon, accompanied 
by the remark that it was not allowed to hinder public 
life. Both strict child-rearing practices in families and at 
school and an oppressive atmosphere at work fostered 
conformity: “The attempted ‘over-socialization’ into 
groups (collectives) suppressed the individuality of the 
individual” (Klicperová et al., 1997, p. 40).  
In his classification of collectivistic and individualis-
tic countries, Triandis (1995, p. 3) also places Russia in 
the 1990s, like the Soviet Union, among the collec-
tivistic countries. Notwithstanding the changing official 
discourse of the early 1990s (e.g. the Constitution of 
1993 with its stress on individual rights and freedoms), 
the supremacy of the state is kept nearly untouched by 
all reforms. Vladimir Putin’s “millennium speech” 
(1999) with its stress on traditional Russian values—
such as patriotism (pride in Russia, its history and ac-
complishments), derzhavnost’ (belief in a Great Russia), 
gosudarstvennichestvo (etatism or ‘the state as source 
and protector of order and as driving force of change’) 
and sotsial’naya solidarnost’ (social solidarity)—is a 
textbook example of the preference of collectivism 
over individualism.  
A different appreciation of the individual by indi-
vidualistic and collectivistic societies evidently affects 
the attitude towards information and the media as in-
formation carriers. The rational individual has an indi-
vidual and universal right to freely available infor-
mation through autonomous media. The “cog in the 
wheel” (Heller, 1988) receives its particular part of the 
information, modelled according to societal goals, 
through dependent and instrumental media. The lack 
of autonomy, and consequently the instrumentality of 
mass media, is an element of continuity in Russian his-
tory. Its social subsystems of politics, economics, law 
and media have never been clearly distinguished from 
each other. In tsarist Russia, the tsar represented legal, 
executive, and juridical power (Malfliet, 1999, p. 36) 
and was often personally engaged in information mat-
ters (e.g. Peter the Great, Catharina the Great). In the 
Soviet Union, the Communist Party took over these 
tasks. The political, economic, juridical and media sys-
tems were closely integrated and connected by ideolo-
gy (Marxism-Leninism) and the Party organization. The 
mass media were considered instruments of the van-
guard Party. Lenin formulated the task of the mass 
media as a collectivist propagandist, agitator and or-
ganizer (Bol’shaya, 1952, vol. 10, p. 8). Journalists were 
party functionaries in the first place, but of a type that 
could also write (Lenin, 1988, pp. 66-67). Stalin not on-
ly used the term “instrument” (orudie) but also the 
word “weapon” (oruzhie) to describe mass media 
(Bol’shaya, 1952, vol. 10, p. 8). The most important 
principle, as listed in handbooks for journalists, was 
“partiality” or partiinost’ (de Smaele, 2001, pp. 38-42). 
Information was made instrumental to societal goals.  
The instrumental view of mass media survived 
Communism. Mikhaïl Gorbachev (1985−1991) depend-
ed on the mass media to promote his glasnost policy 
and to win the population for his reforms. The media 
function of mobilization was kept untouched, only its 
goal changed slightly into dynamic socialism instead of 
stagnant Communism. Boris Yeltsin (1991−1999) was 
the self-appointed patron of press freedom, but in re-
turn he, too, expected loyal support for his reforms 
from the media. Newspapers that were favourably dis-
posed towards Yeltsin’s regime, were financially re-
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warded (Richter, 1995, pp. 15-16). In the run-up to the 
presidential elections of June 1996, the mass media 
were massively mobilized to secure Yeltsin’s second 
term as president (EIM, 1996). Moscow students of 
journalism throughout the 1990s were taught the last-
ing value of partiinost’ (Prokhorov, 1998, pp. 157-88) 
and the educational, ideological and organisational ra-
ther than the informational functions of the mass me-
dia (Prokhorov, 1998, pp. 46-48). The difference be-
tween Yeltsin’s Russia and the Soviet Union was that 
not all journalists were instruments for one and the 
same government or party. Instead, they were at the 
disposal of widely divergent patrons. Hence, Yeltsin’s 
Russia evolved into a corporate or oligarchic system 
with him as arbitrator among concurrent power groups 
of politicians, bankers, media tycoons, business people 
and bureaucrats. Due to the strong political-economic 
conflict of interest of the elite, the autonomy of the so-
cial subsystems, including the media system, remained 
limited. Media magnates were simultaneously politi-
cians and businessmen. Their investments in the media 
were inspired by both economic gain and political am-
bitions (Vartanova, 1997). Analogous to the corporate 
societal system, Yassen Zassoursky (1999) labelled the 
Russian media system in the late 1990s an “authoritar-
ian-corporate system”. His grandson, Ivan Zassoursky 
(1999), spoke of the “mediapolitical system”. Both la-
bels point to the symbiosis of private capital, politics and 
media. The latter are not an independent “fourth pow-
er”, but serve the (political-economic) power groups.  
The individual and collective interests are conflict-
ing values everywhere. But, whereas in Western-
Europe the basic right is the individual right to infor-
mation, and limitations to that freedom are the excep-
tions, the opposite is true of transitional Russia. Mi-
khail Gulyaev (1996, p. 14) speaks about “the tradition 
of the policy of enforced secrecy” as a method to con-
trol the information flow. Notwithstanding the law, re-
stricted access to information is common practice. Par-
ticipants of an IREX meeting (IREX, 2001, p. 196) to 
discuss the media situation in Russia came to the con-
clusion that “access to some publicly relevant infor-
mation is not free: authorities continue to view infor-
mation as their property, and want to control access.” 
In the annual reports of violations of journalists’ rights 
(compiled by the Glasnost Defence Foundation since 
1993), the violation of their right to information—
namely denials of information, refusals of accreditation 
and admission to press conferences and certain loca-
tions—remains a highly quoted problem. Surveys cited 
by Svitich and Shiryaeva (1997, p. 157) confirm this 
finding as well as the deterioration of the situation 
throughout the 1990s. Especially difficult to obtain are 
bare facts, figures, and documents. Little has changed 
in this respect since Soviet times. The executive branch 
has the worst reputation with regard to openness of in-
formation, followed by the security services, commer-
cial, state and financial companies. Since the Soviet 
era, state organisations have generally become less 
transparent with less clearly defined functions and 
competences (Svitich & Shiryaeva, 1997, pp. 154-160). 
Not only the state is to blame. Whereas American 
journalists consider the watchdog role of journalists vis 
à vis the government their second most important task 
(following the distribution of information), Russian 
journalists do not as “they share leadership with state 
officials” (Wu, Weaver, & Johnson, 1996, p. 538). Ac-
cording to the same survey, Russian journalists stress 
their role in shaping the political agenda twelve times 
more than American journalists, a role the latter in fact 
consider of least importance. 
3.2. Relation of Man to Man: Particularism versus 
Universalism 
When the relation of man to the state is expressed by 
the value pair individualism and collectivism, the rela-
tion of man to man can be described by the values of 
universalism versus particularism. In short and in gen-
eral, the distinction comes down to the precedence of 
general rules, codes, values and standards over particu-
lar needs and claims of friends and relations (universal-
ism) or, in contrast, the precedence of human friend-
ship, relations, and situations over rules (particularism). 
In the original, theological sense, universalism points to 
the belief that ultimately all humanity will be saved by 
God’s grace. Particularism, on the other hand, holds 
that only the chosen will be saved. In the sociological 
sense, the pair universalism-particularism derives first 
and foremost from the dichotomic pattern-variables of 
Talcott Parsons (1990). These are patterns of inherent-
ly cultural value-orientation, but they become inte-
grated both in personalities and in societal systems. 
The choice between universalism and particularism 
comes down to the choice between a cognitive or an 
appreciative standard, between referring to a general 
framework (objectivity) or itself (subjectivity). In the 
ontological or philosophical-anthropological sense, as 
underlying the French Revolution and the Enlighten-
ment, universalism sees all men as equal. Universalism 
then is “the treatment of all persons alike based upon 
general criteria and not upon any special or unique 
characteristics of the persons themselves” (Orum, 
Johnstone, & Riger, 1999, p. 534) whereas particular-
ism is “the treatment of people as special individuals, 
based on their personal features, rather than as mem-
bers of some broader class or group” (Orum et al., 
1999, p. 528). The distinction between universalism 
and particularism reminds us of Tönnies’s distinction 
between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft or Durkheim’s 
distinction between “mechanical” and “organic” soli-
darity. Universalism, Gesellschaft or organic solidarity 
is commonly associated with liberalism, civil society 
and rationalism. Particularism, Gemeinschaft or me-
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chanic solidarity is associated with nationalism and 
romanticism (e.g. Mertus, 1999). 
Particularistic cultures are—in the terminology of 
Edward T. Hall (1976/1989)—high context communica-
tion environments while universalist cultures are low 
context communication environments. Context, in this 
sense, has to do with how much you need to know be-
fore you can communicate effectively. In high-context 
cultures “most of the information is either in the physi-
cal context or internalized in the person, while very lit-
tle is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the 
message”. In low-context cultures, in contrast, “the 
mass of information is vested in the explicit code” 
(Hall, 1989, p. 91). Consequently, high-context cultures 
communicate intensively within their in-groups that 
are aware of the context while out-groups are largely 
left out (particularism). Low-context cultures do not 
differentiate as much as high-context cultures between 
in- and out-groups; information is freely available for 
both in- and out-group members (universalism). More 
specifically, we can state that information is considered 
a universal right—for all individuals without distinc-
tion—in the universalistic variant and a particularistic 
right or a privilege—for certain groups or individuals—
in the particularistic variant. 
Despite its theoretical “universal” ambitions, Com-
munist Russia was particularistic rather than universal-
istic: “Important features of the Leninist type were that 
it was not based on citizenship and that it was not, de-
spite its protestations, universalistic in the real sense of 
the word, because entitlement to social benefits de-
pended upon being a loyal worker or employee of the 
state”, Mareš, Musil and Rabušic (1994, p. 83) write. 
The sociologist Igor Kon (1996, p. 197) points at the 
priority of the “particularistic norm of group privilege 
over the universalistic principle of human rights”. The 
Orwellian phrase “all animals are equal but some ani-
mals are more equal than others” reveals as nothing else 
the discrepancy between the universalist claims and the 
particularist reality. The empirical study based on the 
World Values Survey of 1991 reveals for early post-
Communist Russia a weak score on the value of “univer-
salism” and confirms the failed universal ambition of 
Marxism in Russia (Verbeeren & de Smaele, 2004).  
Information in Russia has never been available to 
everyone on the same conditions. In sharp contrast 
with the theoretical ideal of the classless society, Soviet 
society was characterized by a strong vertical segrega-
tion with the “elite” (party leaders) on the one hand 
and “the mass” on the other. Novosel (1995) speaks of 
“first class” and “second class” citizens. The first was a 
privileged class whose privileges were institutionalised 
by the nomenklatura system. These not only encom-
passed material privileges (such as housing, food, 
health care, and education) but also enhanced access 
to information, from the right to see “forbidden” films 
or read “forbidden” books (that is, films and books not 
considered suitable for general distribution) (e.g. Benn, 
1992, p. 9) to the receipt of special foreign news bulle-
tins, put together on a daily basis by TASS and distrib-
uted on differently coloured paper according to the 
degree of detail and the targeted readers (Lendvai, 
1981, pp. 129-131). Although the highly-placed officials 
obviously could claim access to more information, they 
too received information on a “need-to-know” basis 
(Bauer, Inkeles, & Kluchkhohn, 1959, p. 43). The overall 
result was an information deficit. Information was one 
of the most sought after commodities in the Soviet Un-
ion (Ellis, 1999, p. 6). Informal networks, oral commu-
nication and rumours filled the vacuum (Banai, 1997, p. 
252; Bauer & Gleicher, 1964; Chilton, Ilyin, & Mey, 
1998, p. 20; Inkeles & Bauer, 1959, pp. 163-165). Paral-
lel to the official information circuit and analogous to 
the black market, an unofficial information circuit (e.g. 
samizdat) was functioning. Bauer et al. (1959, pp. 74-
78) speak of “informal adjustive mechanisms” devel-
oped by the population as a reaction to the high de-
gree of control and centralization. The use of personal 
networks and informal contacts to obtain sparsely 
available goods, services, and information and to side-
step formal procedures, is indicated by the Russian 
word blat or the term ZIS (znakomstva I svyazi, ac-
quaintances and contacts) (Ledeneva, 1998, p. 1). 
These informal blat-networks can be considered par-
ticularistic networks wherein personal ties do play a 
bigger part than universal procedures and institutions: 
“It was in essence a value-system that depended upon 
men and not upon laws” (Markham, 1967, p. 21). Ellis 
(1999, pp. 6-7) speaks about a paradox: the Soviet Un-
ion honours the principle of “public property” but re-
fuses to consider information as a public property 
whereas in the West private property and owners’ 
rights are honoured but much information is freely ac-
cessible to everyone.  
The particularist orientation can be found in all as-
pects of societal organization. Russian political life, for 
example, is highly characterized by particular in-groups 
versus out-groups: different clans or oligarchs fight 
each other and value their particular interests higher 
than the common interest. In economics, personal, 
particularistic relations, often linked with corruption 
and privileges, are more important than professional, 
impersonal, universal market relations, procedures and 
institutions (Bryant, 1994, p. 70). In the transition from 
Communism to post-Communism, privileged access to 
information played a crucial role in the process of pri-
vatizations, which became known as insider privatiza-
tions (e.g. Arik, 1999, pp. 52-53). State property was 
privatized according to rules written by “the elite” for 
itself (Androunas, 1993, p. 45). Together with Ledeneva 
(1998, pp. 184-185) we can state that blat played a role 
in the first privatizations. Whereas in the Soviet Union 
information concerned mainly what, where and how to 
obtain scarce goods, during the transition period it also 
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pertained to information about money, business, laws 
and taxes, licenses, loans and other scarce ‘inside’ in-
formation (Ledeneva, 1998, p. 209).  
Privileged information played an important role in 
the transition process, but remains important also in 
post-Communist Russia, where the right to information 
and inadmissibility of censorship are included in the 
1993 Constitution (Art. 29) and in the 1991 Russian 
Federation Law on the Mass Media (Art. 1). Notwith-
standing the law, access to information remains a 
much quoted problem. The sole remedy according to 
Konovalov (2002, p. 49) lies in maintaining close and 
personal connections with, for example, the Defence 
Ministry and the security services. The observation of 
Vladimir Ermolin (2002, p. 7) is identical: journalists do 
not receive rights by laws, but by the personal prefer-
ence of (state) officials and press services. By law, the 
media are equal, but by preference some are more 
equal than others. Code words in the process of infor-
mation gathering in Russia remain “trust, relations, and 
integration” (Banai, 1997, p. 242). Authorities have re-
lations with some media professionals, who enjoy the 
privilege to receive information unavailable to the rest 
of the media. Among the privileged media in the Yelt-
sin era were, according to Gulyaev (1996, p. 14), news 
agencies such as ITAR-TASS and Interfaks, newspapers 
such as Kommersant and Izvestiya, and weeklies such 
as Argumenti i Fakty. The most important private 
channel NTV has had changing relationships with the 
president and his administration (from “neutral” or 
“opposition” in 1994−1995 to “supporter” during the 
1996 presidential elections, and “opposition” in 2000). 
With each phase the level of access to information 
shifted accordingly. In the early years, when NTV 
adopted an oppositional stand, access to the Kremlin 
was forbidden for NTV-journalists on occasions. In Sep-
tember 1996, however, the “collaborating” channel re-
ceived a broadcast license for the entire fourth channel 
by presidential decree and enjoyed privileges such as 
the same transmission rates as state channels and en-
hanced access to information. Acting in opposition 
again, the channel saw its privileges, and ultimately its 
future, disappear. Another illustration is provided by 
the Kremlin’s handling of the Kursk disaster in the 
summer of 2000. Media coverage was restricted, only 
one journalist from the state-controlled television 
channel RTR was granted full access to the scene. 
Konovalov (2002, p. 51) calls the Kursk disaster crucial 
for dividing journalists into “ours” and “others”. Jour-
nalists of state media like RTR are “ours” and conse-
quently enjoy enhanced access to information. 
Konovalov also ranks the obedient media according to 
their proximity to the Kremlin (for television stations, 
in declining order: RTR, ORT, NTV, TV-Centre).  
Very few journalists or media claim their right to 
receive information before court (Svitich & Shiryaeva, 
1997, p. 160). They prefer to overcome the information 
barriers by other means, such as maintaining privileged 
relations or bribing officials and openly purchasing in-
formation from them. Journalists also only rarely send 
formal letters of inquiry. Formal inquiry, moreover, ap-
pears as a highly ineffective method in comparison 
with personal contacts and visits to institutions and of-
ficials. An experimental study in Voronezh is illustra-
tive: where approximately 70% of formal letters of en-
quiry resulted in the refusal of information, 70% of 
personal visits to officials, in contrast, led to ac-
ceptance and access to information (Arapova, 2003). 
And, “if these methods [‘back doors’, privileged rela-
tions, personal contacts] are beyond them, they [the 
journalists] resort to fabrication and conjecture” ac-
cording to the Presidential Judicial Chamber for Infor-
mation Disputes and the Union of Russian Journalists in 
their 1995 “joint recommendation on the freedom of 
mass information and the responsibility of journalists” 
(Price, Richter, & Yu, 2002, p. 341). The latter, thus, as-
signs responsibility for the dissemination of untruthful 
information in the media to the closed administration: 
“Unreliability, incompleteness, and distortion of infor-
mation very often results from the inaccessibility of 
sources of information” (Price et al., 2002, p. 341). 
3.3. Nature of Knowledge and Truth: Dominance versus 
Pluralism 
Pluralism, commonly associated with democracy and 
liberalism, acknowledges the existence of all (political) 
players and their opinions. Consequently, in a pluralist 
democracy one does not seek the one and only truth 
but a workable compromise, a balanced view accepta-
ble to all. The pluralist “search for truth” contrasts with 
the dominant “monopoly of truth”. In an authoritarian 
society, “truth was conceived to be not the product of 
the great mass of people, but of a few wise men who 
were in a position to guide and direct their fellows. 
Thus truth was thought to be centered near the center 
of power.” (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 2).  
Authoritarian societies are closed societies: “socie-
ties that do not accept the legitimacy of different per-
spectives on social, political, religious, or normative 
questions on which reasonable men inevitably disa-
gree” (Mayer, 1989, p. 236). Open, pluralist societies, 
in contrast, welcome divergent views. In order to re-
veal the truth, all opinions need to be heard in an open 
marketplace: “pluralistic views of reality, taken togeth-
er, were expected to provide a representative mosaic 
of truth” (Schoenbach, 1983, p. 34). A closed, dominant 
society rejects freedom of information as useless or 
disturbing while an open, pluralist society considers 
freedom of information as essential to its health.  
The Soviet Union was a closed society: closed for in-
formation from outside (e.g. jamming of foreign radio 
stations, limited import of foreign books and journals, 
small percentage of foreign television programmes) 
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but also reluctant to release “inside information” to its 
own citizens. Journalists (who were carefully selected 
and educated) had extremely limited access to infor-
mation in the first place, and even the information ac-
quired had to pass several strict (mainly political-
ideological) filters before appearing in the news. A lim-
ited flow of information was the norm. 
As in Communist Russia (see for example Berdja-
jew, 1947, p. 5), in post-Communist Russia too the mo-
nopolistic view on truth and a dualist view on morality 
(good versus bad) are twin leading principles. Politics 
and morals are often confused, various opinions are 
not considered to be morally equal (Dolgopolov, 2000, 
p. 5; McDaniel, 1996, p. 17). What is strived for in Russia, 
is not “a” decision but “the”—right—decision (Sergeyev 
& Biryukov, 1993, p. 25). “Truth is unitary…community 
must also be unitary…opposition and diversity is false-
hood and therefore deserves no hearing”, McDaniel 
(1936, p. 35) summarizes. Levada (1996, p. 300) and 
Millard (1994, p. 27), in their turn, point at intolerance 
towards dissident or divergent behaviour. William 
Zimmerman (1995, p. 631) has called this “synoptic 
thinking”: “the view that there is only one correct phi-
losophy”. The Russian word sobornost’ not only points 
at the (mystic) unity and connectedness of the Russian 
people but has also a political connotation, with the 
meaning of a dislike of fractions and opposition and a 
preference for unanimous decisions. Sergeyev and Bi-
ryukov (1993) contrast the “model of sobornost’” with 
the parliamentarian model with its fractions, represen-
tations and compromise. McDaniel (1996, p. 52) places 
the Russian “government of truth” versus the Western 
“government of law”. 
3.4. Clusters of Values 
The above-mentioned values form coherent clusters. 
The values of universalism, individualism and pluralism 
seem to gather, and so do the values of collectivism, 
particularism and dominance. Hofstede (1994, p. 2), for 
example, found a strong correlation between individu-
alism, universalism, and autonomy on the one hand, 
and collectivism, particularism, and dependency on the 
other. Triandis (1995, p. 19) connects individualism 
with liberalism and collectivism with authoritarianism 
and Marxist collectivism. More in general he links the 
former with ‘the West’ and the latter with “the rest” 
(Triandis, 1995, p. 13). More recent empirical research 
on universalism based on the World Values Survey 
showed a clear North-South and East-West opposition 
within Europe, and a correlation between universalism 
and democracy (Verbeeren & de Smaele, 2004). Su-
varierol (2004) studied the communication habits of 
European Commission officials and observed a clear 
North-South dimension according to the degree of uni-
versalism causing different communication behaviour 
patterns. In general, a parallel between universalism 
and transparency of governance—interpreted as 
openness of government information—can be ob-
served. The Nordic countries, which score high on uni-
versalism, are forerunners in the domain of transpar-
ency of governance too. Sweden, together with 
Finland, were the first in Europe to install in 1766 the 
“Act on the Freedom of Publishing and the Right of Ac-
cess to Official Documents” (Janssen, 2012). Both were 
followed by the other Nordic countries Norway and 
Denmark, as well as “universalist” France and The 
Netherlands. Transparency of governance in Central 
and Southern European countries was the subject of 
legislative acts only much later, and in fact, legislation 
still is inadequately implemented (Suvarierol, 2004).  
The majority of media systems can be situated 
somewhere in between the two extremes of pluralism 
and dominance. Hence, the classification is not to be 
considered a strict dichotomy but a continuum going 
from full autonomy to complete control. The distinctive 
criterion, thus, is the degree of control. Additionally, al-
so the perception and appreciation of control plays a 
role. Whereas in the West, control over media is per-
ceived negatively and media autonomy is seen as an 
ideal (but not necessarily within reach), in the Soviet 
Union, for example, personal and media autonomy 
were consciously rejected. Sparks (2000, p. 36) formu-
lated this as follows: “the only real difference between 
what was believed in Prospect Marxa 20 [Lenin’s view 
on the press] and what was believed in the Armory 
Building [Schramm’s description of the Communist 
press in Four Theories] was in the evaluation of the sys-
tem in question”. The same could be said for the ma-
jority of non-Western countries that do not necessarily 
appreciate the Western ideal of freedom or, indeed, 
so-called “chaos” (Merrill, 2002, pp. 22-23). 
4. Conclusion 
We looked into the concept of information culture dur-
ing transition from Communism to post-Communism in 
Russia. Collectivism, particularism and dominance ap-
pear as key values to describe the handling of infor-
mation in both the Communist Soviet Union and post-
Communist Russia in the 1990s. In this article we did 
not go into the many changes in Russian media during 
transition. Changes, though, are numerous. Post-
Communist Russia became a different country with re-
gard to media ownership structure, media law, and 
media content. The 1993 Constitution fundamentally 
reversed the relation of man to the state and acknowl-
edged the principles of individuality, plurality, democ-
racy, and market economy. De jure this is an obvious 
“out of the old” and “into the new”. The de facto im-
plementation of the law and everyday behaviour, how-
ever, could raise doubt about the consolidation of the 
new order and reminds us of the earlier cited quote of 
Karol Jakubowicz (2005, p. 2): “It is not enough to in-
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troduce new institutions: what is also needed is the 
cultural foundations of those institutions, the values, 
attitudes and beliefs which make them work, and 
which encourage the people to take them for granted.”  
Western observers and advisers perhaps too easily 
presumed that “the new order” automatically would 
be “the Western order”. The overview of the first ten 
years of post-Communist Russia reveal that at least in 
the field of information and communication dominant 
values were not all of a sudden replaced by Western 
values. A further look into the Putin era is recommend-
able to extend the time dimension of the study and to 
see whether values start to modify or consolidate. As 
for Yeltsin’s Russia, we can conclude that it is post-
Communist indeed, by continued value orientations 
prevalent also in Communist Russia.  
Acknowledgments 
The research was partially supported by the Brussels 
Center for Journalism Studies. 
Conflict of Interests 
The author declares no conflict of interests. 
References 
Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963/1989). The civic culture. 
Political attitudes and democracy in five nations. 
London: Sage.  
Androunas, E. (1993). Soviet media in transition. Struc-
tural and economic alternatives. Londen: Praeger. 
Arapova, G. (2003). The right to access to information: 
Monitoring experience. Media Expert, 4. Retrieved 
from http://www.medialaw.ru/e_pages/laws/project/ 
r2-3.htm 
Arik, M. (1999). Controversies of the post-Communist 
transition. Eurasian Studies, 16(autumn-winter), 51-
73. 
Banai, M. (1997). Children of the system: Management 
in Russia. In T. Clark (Ed.), Advancement in organiza-
tional behaviour. Essays in honour of Derek S. Pugh 
(pp. 241-257). Aldershot, Brookfield: Ashgate. 
Bauer, R. A., Inkeles, A., & Kluchkhohn, C. (1959). How 
the Soviet system works. Cultural, psychological, and 
social themes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Bauer, R. A., & Gleicher, D. B. (1964). Word-of-mouth 
communication in the Soviet Union. In L. A. Dexter & 
D. M. White (Eds.), People, society and mass com-
munications (pp. 413-428). New York: The Free Press 
of Glencoe. 
Benn, D. W. (1992). From glasnost to freedom of speech. 
Russian openness and international relations. Lon-
don: Pinter. 
Berdjajew, N. (1947). Het Russische denken in de 19e & 
20e eeuw. Aspecten en perspectieven (oorspr. 
Russkaya mysl’ v devyatnadsatom veke i v nachale 
dvadsatogo veka). Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij. 
Berry, J. W. (1994). Ecology of individualism and collec-
tivism. In U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, Ç. Kâgitçibasi, S.-C. 
Choi, & G. Yoon (Eds.), Individualism and collectivism. 
Theory, method, and applications (pp. 77-84). Lon-
don: Sage.  
Bol’shaya (1952). Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya 
(2nd ed., Vol. 10). Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Nauch-
noe Izdatel’stvo.  
Brown, A. (1979). Introduction. In A. Brown & J. Gray 
(Eds.), Political culture and political change in Com-
munist states (2nd ed., pp. 1-24). London: MacMil-
lan. 
Bryant, C. (1994). Economic utopianism and sociological 
realism. Strategies for transformation in East-Central 
Europe. In C. Bryant & E. Mokrzycki (Eds.), The new 
great transformation? Change and continuity in East-
Central Europe. London: Routledge. 
Chilton, P. A., Ilyin, M. V., & Mey, J. L. (Eds.) (1998). Polit-
ical discourse in transition in Europe 1989−1991. Am-
sterdam: Benjamin Publishing Company.  
de Smaele, H. (2001). Massamedia in Communistisch en 
postCommunistisch Rusland (1917−2000). Factoren 
van continuïteit of van verandering? (doctoral disser-
tation). Gent: Universiteit Gent.  
de Smaele, H. (2006). In the name of democracy: The 
paradox of democracy and press freedom in post-
Communist Russia. In K. Voltmer (Ed.), Mass media 
and political communication in new democracies (pp. 
42-58). London: Routledge. 
de Smaele, H. (2010). In search of a label for the Russian 
media system. In B. Dobek-Ostrowska, M. Glowacki, 
K. Jakubowicz, & M. Sükösd (Eds.), Comparative me-
dia systems: European and global perspectives (pp. 
41-62). Budapest: CEU Press. 
Deutsch, K.W. (1974) Politics and government. How 
people decide their fate (2nd ed.). Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company.  
Dolgopolov, G. (2000). World history in 60 seconds: How 
Bank Imperial re-edited Russian binary logic. Social 
Semiotics, 10(1), 5-20. 
EIM (European Institute for the Media). (1996). Prelimi-
nary Report. Media and the Russian presidential elec-
tions, 4 July 1996. Düsseldorf: European Institute for 
the Media. 
Ellis, F. (1999). From glasnost to the Internet. Russia’s 
new infosphere. London: Macmillan. 
Engesser, S., & Franzetti, A. (2011). Media systems and 
political systems: Dimensions of comparison. Inter-
national Communication Gazette, 73(4), 273-301.  
Ermolin, V. (2002). Pressa i silovye vedomstva: 
vzaimoterpimost’ kak forma sotrudnichestva. In M. 
Pogorelyj & I. Safranchuk (Eds), Sovremennaya ros-
sijskaya voennaya zhurnalistika. Opyt, problemy, per-
spektivy (pp. 73-86). Moscow: Gendal’f. 
Gulyaev, M. (1996). Media as contested power in post-
 Media and Communication, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 4, Pages 15-25 24 
glasnost Russia. Post-Soviet Media Law & Policy 
Newsletter, 29, 12-16. 
Hall, E. T. (1976/1989). Beyond culture. New York: Dou-
bleday. 
Hall, E. T., & Hall, M. R. (1987). Hidden differences. Doing 
business with the Japanese. Garden City, NY: Anchor 
Press/Doubleday. 
Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing media sys-
tems. Three models of media and politics. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2012). Comparing media sys-
tems beyond the Western world. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.  
Hanitzsch, T. (2011). Populist disseminators, detached 
watchdogs, critical change agents and opportunist 
facilitators: professional milieus, the journalistic field 
and autonomy in 18 countries. International Com-
munication Gazette, 73(6), 477-494.  
Heller, M. (1988). Cogs in the wheel. The formation of 
Soviet man. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.  
Hofstede, G. (1994). Foreword. In U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, 
Ç. Kâgitçibasi, S.-C. Choi, & G. Yoon (Eds.), Individual-
ism and collectivism. Theory, method, and applica-
tions (pp. ix-xiii). Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: 
Sage. 
Inkeles, A., & Bauer, R. A. (1959). The Soviet citizen. Daily 
life in a totalitarian society. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press. 
IREX (International Research & Exchange Board). (2001). 
Media Sustainability Index 2001. Retrieved from 
http://www.irex.org/msi/index.asp 
Jakubowicz, K. (2005, March). Post-Communist media 
development in perspective. In Internationale Poli-
tikanalyse: Europäische Politik/Politikinformation 
Osteuropa. Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
Janssen, K. (2012). Open government data and the right 
to information: opportunities and obstacles. The 
Journal of Community Informatics, 8(2). Retrieved 
from http://www.ci-journal.net/index.php/ciej/arti 
cle/view/952/954 
Kagitçibasi, Ç. (1994). A critical appraisal of individualism 
and collectivism. Toward a new formulation. In U. 
Kim, H. C. Triandis, Ç. Kâgitçibasi, S.-C. Choi, & G. 
Yoon (Eds.), Individualism and collectivism. Theory, 
method, and applications (pp. 52-65). Thousand 
Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage.  
Klicperová, M., Feierabend, I. K., & Hofstetter, R. (1997). 
In the search for a post-Communist syndrome: A 
theoretical framework and empirical assessment. 
Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 7, 
39-52.  
Kon, I. S. (1996). Moral culture. In D. Shalin (Ed.), Russian 
culture at the crossroads. Paradoxes of postCom-
munist consciousness (pp. 185-207). Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. 
Konovalov, I. (2002). Voennaya telezhurnalistika: oso-
bennosti zhanra. In M. Pogorelyi, & I. Safranchuk 
(Eds.), Sovremennaya rossiiskaya voennaya zhurnal-
istika. Opyt, problemy, perspektivy (pp. 40-59). Mos-
cow: Gendal’f.  
Ledeneva, A. V. (1998). Russia’s economy of favours: 
Blat, networking, and informal exchange. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lendvai, P. (1981). The bureaucracy of truth. How Com-
munist governments manage the news. London: 
Burnett Books. 
Lenin, V. I. (1988). Over kunst en literatuur. Moscow: 
Progres. 
Levada, Y. A. (1996). Civic culture. In D. Shalin (Ed.), Rus-
sian culture at the crossroads. Paradoxes of post-
Communist consciousness (pp. 299-319). Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press. 
Malfliet, K. (1999). De geest van het Russische recht. Een 
voorstudie. Leuven and Amersfoort: Acco. 
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1984). The new institutional-
ism: organizational factors in political life. American 
Political Science Review, 78(3), 734-749. 
Mareš, P., Musil, L., & Rabušic, L. (1994). Values and the 
welfare state in Czechoslovakia. In C. Bryant & E. 
Mokrzycki (Eds.), The new great transformation? 
Change and continuity in East-Central Europe (pp. 
78-98). London: Routledge. 
Markham, J. W. (1967). Voices of the red giants. Com-
munications in Russia and China. Ames: The Iowa 
State University Press. 
Mayer, L. C. (1989). Redefining comparative politics. 
Promise versus performance. London: Sage. 
McDaniel, T. (1996). The agony of the Russian idea. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
McQuail, D. (1994). Mass communication theory: An in-
troduction (3th ed.). London: Sage. 
Merrill, J.C. (2002). Chaos and order. Sacrificing the indi-
vidual for the sake of social harmony. In J. B. Atkins 
(Ed.), The mission: Journalism, ethics and the world 
(pp. 17-35). Ames: Iowa State Press. 
Mertus, J. (1999). The liberal state vs the national soul: 
Mapping civil society transplants. Social and Legal 
Studies, 8(1), 121-146.  
Millard, F. (1994). The anatomy of the new Poland. Post-
Communist politics in its first phase. Aldershot: Ed-
ward Elgar.  
Novosel, P. (1995). The iron law of communication. In D. 
J. Paletz, K. Jakubowicz, & P. Novosel (Eds.), Glasnost 
and after. Media and change in Central and Eastern 
Europe (pp. 9-17). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. 
Orum, A. M., Johnstone, J. W. C., & Riger, S. (1999). 
Changing societies. Essential sociology for our times. 
Lanham, Boulder, New York and Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
Parsons, T. (1990). Towards a general theory of action. 
Michigan: UMI.  
Pasti, S., & Nordenstreng, K. (2013). Paradoxes of jour-
nalistic profession: Case of Russia in the context of 
the Brics countries. In E. L. Vartanova (Ed.), World of 
 Media and Communication, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 4, Pages 15-25 25 
media: Yearbook of Russian media and journalism 
studies (pp. 243-268). Moscow: Lomonosov Moscow 
State University.  
Price, M. E., Richter, A., & Yu, P. K. (Eds.) (2002). Russian 
media law and policy in the Yeltsin decade. Essays 
and documents. The Hague, London and New York: 
Kluwer Law International. 
Prokhorov, E. P. (1998). Vvedenie v teoriy zhurnalistiki. 
Uchebnoe posobie (2nd ed.). Moscow: RIP-kholding. 
Putin, V. (1999, 31 December). Rossiya na rubezhe ty-
syacheleti. Retrieved from http://www.government. 
gov.ru/government/minister/article-vvpl.html  
Richter, A. (1995). The Russian press after Perestroika. 
Canadian Journal of Communication, 20(1), 7-23. 
Schoenbach, K. (1983). News in the Western world. In J. 
L. Martin & A. G. Chaudhary (Eds.), Comparative 
mass media systems (pp. 33-43). New York: Long-
man. 
Sergeyev, V., & Biryukov, N. (1993). Russia’s road to de-
mocracy. Parliament, Communism and traditional 
culture. Aldershot & Brookfield: Edward Elgar. 
Shevtsova, L. (1996). After the elections: The balance of 
power among political institutions. Paper presented 
at the Conference “Five Years into the Transition: 
where is Russia headed?”, Washington, DC, National 
Endowment for Democracy and Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, 20 September. 
Siebert, F. S., Peterson, T., & Schramm, W. (1956). Four 
theories of the press. The authoritarian, libertarian, 
social responsibility and Soviet Communist concepts 
of what the press should be and do. Urbana: Univer-
sity of Illinois Press.  
Sparks, C. (2000). Media theory after the fall of Europe-
an Communism. Why the old models from East and 
West won’t do any more. In J. Curran & M.-J. Park 
(Eds.), De-Westernizing media studies (pp. 35-49). 
London: Routledge.  
Suvarierol, S. (2004). Evolving culture in the European 
Commission? Commission officials, cultural differ-
ences, and networking behavior. Research outline for 
the NIG annual work conference. Retrieved from 
https://ep.eur.nl/bitstream/1765/1745/2/NIG1-06.p 
df#search=%22suvarierol%20EC%20universalism%22  
Svitich, L. G., & Shiryaeva, A. A. (1997). Zhurnalistskoe 
obrazovanie: vzglyad sotsiologa. Moscow: IKAR. 
Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism & collectivism. Boul-
der, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press. 
Vartanova, E. (1997). Russian financial elite as media 
moguls. Paper presented at the International Con-
ference on Media and Politics, 27 February−1 March 
1997. Brussels: KUB. 
Vartanova, E. (2006, 15 November). Russian media be-
tween the West and the East. Lecture. Helsinki: Ale-
ksanteri Institute. Retrieved from http://www. 
helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/maisterikoulu/opinto-
opas/luentokurssit/oppimateriaali/russian_media_m
odel/Lecture_2.ppt#256,1,Russia Media between the 
West and the East 
Verbeeren, J., & de Smaele, H. (2004). Universalism and 
particularism in the Western world. Implications of 
basic value orientations for perspectives of democra-
cy. Paper presented at the Third Interdisciplinary 
Conference “Democracy and Culture in the Transat-
lantic World”, Maastricht, 27-30 October.  
White, S. (1979). The USSR: Patterns of autocracy and 
industrialism. In A. Brown & J. Gray (Eds.), Political 
culture and political change in Communist states 
(2nd ed., pp. 25-65). London and Basingstoke: Mac-
Millan.  
Wu, W., Weaver, D., & Johnson, O. V. (1996). Profes-
sional roles of Russian and US journalists: A compar-
ative study. Journalism & Mass Communication 
Quarterly, 74(3), 534-548.  
Wyman, M. (2000). Political culture and public opinion. 
In M. Bowker & C. Ross (Eds), Russia after the Cold 
War (pp. 103-118). Harlow: Longman. 
Zassoursky, Y. N. (1999). Open society and access to in-
formation: The role of Russian media. In Y. N. 
Zassoursky & E. Vartanova (Eds.), Media, communi-
cations and the open society (pp. 27-37). Moscow: 
Faculty of Journalism, IKAR. 
Zassoursky, I. I. (1999). Mass-Media vtoroi respubliki. 
Moscow: izd. Moskovskogo Universiteta.  
Zimmerman, W. (1995). Synoptic thinking and political 
culture in post-Soviet Russia. Slavic Review, 54, 630-
641. 
About the Author 
 
Dr. Hedwig de Smaele 
Hedwig de Smaele is programme director of the master in Journalism at KU Leuven and a member of 
the Brussels Center for Journalism Studies. Areas of interest are among others media policy, journal-
ism culture, democratization processes and political communication. Her Ph.D (2001) looks at the 
transition of mass media in Russia during the 1980s and 1990s. She has published in journals such as 
European Journal of Communication, Trends in Communication, and Javnost/The Public. 
 
